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GAVIN MILLER
Scotland’s Authentic Plurality:
The New Essentialism in Scottish Studies
Towards the end of  his travelogue, Raw Spirit (2003), Iain Banks reflects on
the symbolic lesson taught to him by his tour of  Scotland’s whisky distilleries.
His preference, he realises, is for whiskies which have been influenced by
flavours from other countries, by drinks such as ‘American bourbon, or Spanish
sherry, or Portuguese port, or French wine or Cuban rum’. His favourite whiskies
are still very much single malts, they are still very much Scotch, but it’s
the interplay between the raw spirit as made in Scotland and those other
tastes brought in from abroad that has made the greatest and most
enduring impression on me.1
Banks’s statement, in which whisky becomes a metaphor for Scottishness, is
just part of  a wider movement in Scottish literary and cultural life towards a
recognition and appreciation of  the plurality, diversity and hybridity of  Scot-
tish culture. Yet though Banks is far from unique in his sentiments, there is
something, in my view, that is particularly symptomatic in his rhetoric. His
metaphor insists that Scottish culture, like Scotch itself, is heterogeneous and
hybrid. Yet its persuasive power derives from the supposed authentic Scot-
tishness of  Scotch: it is because whisky is the essence of  Scottishness that we
find the truth about Scotch to be the truth about ourselves. The idea of  an
authentic Scottishness has therefore not been abandoned; rather, its content
has merely changed, from the supposed purity of  a single malt to the hybridity
and diversity signified by whisky’s maturation in casks that once held bourbon,
sherry, port, wine or rum.
Banks’s metaphor is, I believe, indicative of  a general problem within recent
reflections on Scottishness. The most significant trend in contemporary Scot-
tish literary and cultural criticism has been towards anti-essentialism, and a
sustained assault upon the myth of  Scottish cultural unanimity and homogeneity.
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Yet, this movement – so I shall argue – has never quite fulfilled its anti-essen-
tialist credentials: cultural homogeneity is painstakingly revealed to be an illu-
sion born of  essentialist presuppositions, but then cultural diversity itself  is
offered as the new essence of  Scottishness, as the underlying national character
to which Scottish culture should remain true. In other words, the cultural homo-
geneity that was supposed to indicate an underlying national being is too often
the only – and mistaken – target of  putatively anti-essentialist Scottish criticism.
What remains undissolved is the idea of  an inherent, intrinsic Scottishness, an
essence that Scots may or may not manage to authentically express in their
cultural, political and ethical life. This intrinsic Scottishness is diversity itself;
plurality becomes the new essence of  Scottishness.
This surreptitious return to essentialism largely escapes notice, I believe,
because the key term in the Scottish anti-essentialist programme has not been
defined with sufficient precision. The word ‘essentialism’ is presumably used
with some vague consensus over its meaning, yet the concept has a compli-
cated history, and we must seek clarity about its most appropriate sense in the
debate over Scottish literature and culture.
Some of  the anti-essentialist debate seems to be over what makes a person
count as Scottish. The relevant meaning of  ‘essentialism’ in this context would
be that proposed in the Aristotelian distinction between the essential and acci-
dental properties of  an entity. Aristotle distinguishes between substantial change,
in which the entity itself  is destroyed, and those other kinds of  change in which
the entity endures, but is in some way modified. To take an axe to my kitchen
table, and then burn its wreckage, is to bring about a substantial change; to
paint it green, however, is to bring about an accidental modification. (It is the
modification, of  course, that is accidental; the cause of  the modification is
wholly intentional.) As Irving M. Copi explains, with reference to this example:
If  we can distinguish the different kinds of  change, then we can say that
a given attribute is essential to an object if  its loss would result in the
destruction of  that object, whereas an attribute is a mere accident if  the
object would remain identifiably and substantially the same without it.2
It may seem odd to apply this distinction to nationality: after all, to lose my
nationality is not to be destroyed, any more than the fading of  my tan after a
holiday constitutes my destruction. But it has also been argued that the essence-
accident distinction has no ontological status, but rather is relative to the nature
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of  one’s inquiry: a certain object may have many different kinds of  essence
depending upon the kind of  question being asked about it.3 An inquiry into
nationality, then, may legitimately ask after the essence of  a Scotsman or woman
as a member of  a national community – as opposed to, say, as a living organism
– and so distinguish between properties essential to being Scottish, and those
that are accidental to it.
This account of  essentialism is undoubtedly to some extent that intended
by Scottish anti-essentialists, who occasionally talk of  different definitions of
Scottishness, and inquire whether to become or be Scottish is anything other
than to acquire or maintain the relevant (essential) civic status. In this variant
of  anti-essentialism, the issue is whether Scottishness is adequately charac-
terised by ‘overarching definitions of  the nation’ that seem, nowadays, far too
narrow when confronted with ‘the multicultural, multireligious and also secular
nature of  contemporary Scotland’.4 The narrower definitions seem merely to
have captured characteristics accidental to Scottishness, and to have thereby
implicitly prescribed religious and cultural criteria for membership in the national
community: ‘The walls of  Scottish civic society may have been over-run, but
in the central cultural keep, the besieged few stand firm, marginalising at a
cultural level those whom they have been forced to recognise politically’.5 Insofar
as this kind of  essentialism is the focus of  discussion then it is debatable, I
think, whether the critical programme should really be called ‘anti-essentialism’
at all. The new essence of  being Scottish is simply a particular civic (rather
than ethnic or cultural) status, and what is opposed are false accounts of  Scot-
tishness that seize on the accidental, variable characteristics of  the Scots. 
There is, however, another, more important sense of  ‘essentialism’ relevant
to the debate, but this sense is not – I think – appreciated with enough clarity.
The relevant meaning this time is that in which the essence of  something is
its inner, hidden nature, upon which the thing’s other, accidental or superficial
attributes depend. In national essentialism of  this kind, there is a hidden
essence to the Scottish nation which underlies and explains its various cultural,
ethical and political characteristics. Knowledge of  the supposed hidden essence
allows one to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic Scottishness
according to whether the phenomena in question do, or do not, derive from
the nation’s inner nature. Such explanatory essentialism is distinct from, but
contributes to, the anti-essentialist debate identified above. Insofar as there is
a commitment to the idea of  an underlying Scottishness, then there is a poten-
tial challenge to civic nationalism. The apparent diversity of  the Scots may be
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regarded as a naïve or pre-theoretical apprehension of  the facts. Only the
expert, who is acquainted with the inner nature of  Scottishness, is in a posi-
tion to say whether certain characteristics of  the population are genuinely
derived from the national essence, or whether they are, on the other hand,
pseudo-Scottish phenomena disconnected from the nation’s inner reality.
The account of  essentialism at work in this context certainly owes some-
thing to Aristotle, but also much to empiricist philosophy. The key distinction
is less between essence and accident (although this re-appears, suitably modi-
fied), and more that between ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ essence. As David H. DeGrood
explains, Locke
terms our complex ideas, or our abstract ideas, of  substances ‘nominal
essences’, since they point only to the name of  the unity of  co-existing
properties, not to the real, underlying essence. The ‘nominal essences’,
or more precisely, what the nominal essences denote, are thought to
depend upon and flow from the ‘real essences’.6
Although Locke was pessimistic about penetrating to the ‘unknown constitu-
tion of  the substance’7 from which its properties flowed, it was certainly an
assumption of  Baconian science that ‘man can penetrate to the inmost essence
of  things, or to the internal constitution of  insensible parts’.8 As Copi explains,
modern science thus renewed the Aristotelian distinction between nominal and
real definition: 
To the extent to which one small group of  properties of  a substance
can serve as a basis from which its other properties can be causally
derived, to that extent we can be justified in identifying that group of
properties as its real essence. This view […] is in agreement with Aris-
totle’s doctrine that the definition of  a thing should state its essence,
and that definition is a scientific process.9
We arrive then at another kind of  essentialism in which knowledge of  the real,
‘insensible’ essence of  things explains their other, superficial, accidental qual-
ities. With this knowledge, we may even come to classify the natural world
differently, according to its real essences: things that are superficially the same,
may turn out to be really different (fish and dolphins, say); things that are
superficially different may be essentially the same (diamond and graphite).
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Such explanatory essentialism is, I believe, what Scottish anti-essentialist
criticism should be primarily directed against – namely, the attempt to delin-
eate an inner Scottishness which could, in turn, serve to distinguish between
true and false Scottishness, between real Scots and pseudo-Scots. The attack
on essentialism in Scottish Studies should, in other words, follow the lead set
already in feminism and post-colonialism, both of  which provide fruitful analo-
gies. For the sake of  convenience, I will explore in this essay only the  relevance
of  post-colonial racial anti-essentialism. This is not because feminism is less
relevant, but because the racial anti-essentialist argument is more immediately
plausible. To begin from feminist anti-essentialism, it would be necessary to
show that there is no real essence of  womanhood – constituted by ‘bone
 structure, gonads, hormones, chromosomes, and genes’10 – that underlies and
explains our pre-scientific classification of  the supposed female sex. But a
 critical analysis of  what Myra J. Hird calls ‘the cultural need to support sexual
dimorphism’,11 and what Diana Fuss calls the ‘historical production’ of  the
categories ‘ “man” and “woman”’,12 would be too lengthy a digression in the
present context; the case against racial essentialism can be more concisely and
convincingly stated.
As Kwame Anthony Appiah explains, racial science was an attempt to
discover what we might call (although Appiah does not) the real essence of
the nominal essences afforded by seemingly obvious racial classifications:
‘nineteenth-century race science sought in a heritable racial essence an expla-
nation of  what its proponents took to be the observed phenomena of  the
differential distribution in human populations both of  morphological and of
psychological and social traits’.13 More recent scientific work, though, has
shown that ‘the visible morphology – skin colour, hair type, facial features
– on the basis of  which we make our informal classifications’ gives no signif-
icant indication of  an underlying human typology.14 The discrediting of  racial
science has consequences for cultural interpretation, for racial essentialism
had supposed that cultural similarity (borne of  psychological similarity) was
amongst the features in the nominal essence of  a race: cultural homogeneity
was a component of  the superficial commonality that flowed from the under-
lying real racial essence. But once the idea of  real racial essence is exposed
as a myth, then the obvious corollary is that cultural homogeneity is most
likely an equally mythical residue of  racial essentialism. This is why Appiah
takes it upon himself  to show that Africa, the home of  the supposed black
race, is culturally heterogeneous:
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The psychology of  race has led […] not only to a belief  in the exis-
tence of  a peculiar African form of  thinking but also to a belief  in
special African contents of  thought. The Beninois philosopher Paulin
Hountondji has dubbed this view that Africa is culturally homogeneous
[…] – ‘unanimism’.15
To anyone who might propose such unanimism, Appiah remarks simply that
‘[w]hatever Africans share, we do not have a common traditional culture,
common languages, a common religious or conceptual vocabulary’16 – ‘taste
the bland foods of  Botswana after the spices of  Fanti cooking; try under-
standing Kikuyu or Yoruba or Fulfulde with a Twi dictionary’.17
For the analogy with racial anti-essentialism to hold in Scottish Studies, there
must be found a history of  national essentialism similar to the racial essentialism
analysed by Appiah. The historiographic tradition of  national character or spirit
inaugurated in the eighteenth century by Herder is just such an equivalent. He
proposes that ‘nations modify themselves, according to time, place, and their
internal character: each bears in itself  the standard of  its perfection, totally inde-
pendent of  all comparison with that of  others’.18 Herder’s ‘notion of  national
culture’ supposes, according to Charles Taylor, that ‘different Völker have their
own way of  being human, and shouldn’t betray it by aping others’:19 each Volk
or people has its own proper nature, to which its historical development should
remain true. In Herder’s view, explains F.M. Barnard, the essence of  the Volk
could be traced through analysis of  its ‘socio-cultural characteristics’ – primarily
language, but also such phenomena as ‘social customs, folk-lore and literary tradi-
tions’.20 Methodical investigation could uncover, in Herder’s words, the ‘“invis-
ible, hidden, medium”’21 that bound a people together, and gave them their
distinctive national character. From this idea of  national  character there devel-
oped the tradition of  political Romanticism in which ‘the Herderian concept of
“Volksgeist” played a significant rôle’22 as that ‘decisive, spiritual characteristic, by
virtue of  which a collection of  men acquired a distinct personality of  its own’.23
There is, then, a way of  thinking about nationhood that relies upon the
idea of  some non-biological, but otherwise concealed real essence that is
supposed to account for the nation’s more easily discernible characteristics. In
the transition from biological to historiographic essentialism, the natural-scien-
tific paradigm remains: the historian, or cultural and literary critic, supposedly
engages in a methodical cognition that reveals the underlying national being
from which the various forms of  national life emanate. He or she may then
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confront a national culture with the demand that it remain true to this method-
ically discovered real essence – that it does not malform or distort the expres-
sion of  what the nation ‘really’ is. With this essentialist tradition in mind, we
can attempt to identify an analogous search for an underlying Scottish national
character: Eleanor Bell in Questioning Scotland, for instance, finds – rightly or
wrongly – such a notion of  Scottishness to be apparent in G. Gregory Smith’s
account of  the ‘Caledonian antisyzygy’24 as well as in Cairns Craig’s far more
recent claim for a Scottish ‘national imagination’.25 Bell concludes that such
cultural typifications are, in effect, outmoded and essentialist statements of
national character – they are ‘redundant assertions of  the “national psyche”,
which can only, in actuality, be partial, yet which nonetheless claim a more
significant and teleological status’.26
This allegation about the essentialism of  the earlier corpus of  Scottish literary
criticism is, I might add, open to debate. Even the venerable figure of  Gregory
Smith remarks by way of  caution that ‘there is no Genius which presides over
a nation’s literature with the authority of  a Platonic archetype’.27 But leave aside
this debate: assume, for the sake of  argument, that contemporary Scottish
literary and cultural criticism has in fact identified an outmoded national essen-
tialism in its own practices. One of  the tasks of  the Scottish anti-essentialist
critic will be to challenge the supposed cultural unanimism that would other-
wise stand as nominal essence to the real essence of  the distinctive Scottish
Volksgeist. Although this challenge is not the crux of  anti-essentialism (for that,
properly understood, is the critique of  the notion of  a real national essence),
it is, nonetheless, an important peripheral aim. This is how we might under-
stand the insistence, in Questioning Scotland, on a need to recognise ‘internal
difference and alterity’ in Scottish history and culture.28 This is, we could say,
why Bell opposes this need to a now outmoded ‘imperative to establish a
coherent and organised cultural identity’ central to which is ‘the notion of
homogeneity’.29 In a similar vein, we might identify the same underlying prob-
lematic when the editors of  a volume of  essays appropriately entitled Beyond
Scotland refer to ‘an over-determined, self-defeating essentialism’ in past criti-
cism of  Scottish literature, an essentialism that contrasts with Scottish litera-
ture itself, which ‘has found its “proper ground” in heterogeneity and
inter-dependence’.30 With invariable success, such putatively anti-essentialist crit-
icism reveals that the traditional, supposedly unanimous national culture is as
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Naturally, there are some risks in the enthusiastic exploration of  Scotland’s
cultural diversity. One significant problem is that the plurality thus revealed
comprises many different kinds of  identity, not all of  which can stand in rela-
tions of  mutual celebration. This problem pertains especially to the issue of
socio-economic class. A chapter in the recent Edinburgh Companion to Contem-
porary Scottish Literature refers, for instance, to the role of  contemporary Scot-
tish children’s fiction in ‘demolish[ing] the divisive barriers of  religion, class
and ethnicity’,31 and praises Theresa Breslin’s Divided City (2005) for depicting
a friendship between two boys, one of  whom is a middle-class Protestant, and
the other of  whom is a working-class Catholic. Such an analysis tends, however,
to blend together religious and class differences as equal modes of  diversity,
and to treat class conflict as if  it were essentially the same as sectarianism. But
the two are, of  course, different – for while we might imagine sects without
sectarianism, it is harder to conceive of  economic classes without class conflict.
This is why another essay in the same collection insists that ‘[c]lass antago-
nism’ should not be ‘rewritten as cultural diversity’, that it should not become
‘a revalued sign of  the post nation’s healthy polyphony’.32
I might add, also, that the problem is not merely that class identities tend
to be antagonistic, and so resistant to pluralistic mutual celebration. The problem,
more fundamentally, is that it makes little sense to preserve and celebrate
economic class identity as we might a sexual, ethnic or cultural identity. One
might – as much Scottish literature does – recover from stigmatisation the
culture of  those who are working-class. Or, at least, one can do so in so far
as these cultural traits are – like accent, dialect and orthography – purely arbi-
trary (analogous to the Saussurean signifier); one cannot legitimately do so
when the cultural trait is an index of  poverty and disadvantage (poor diet, crim-
inality, illiteracy). But regardless of  the extent to which such cultural phenomena
can be celebrated, the point remains that to be working-class is not to have a
particular cultural identity, and that to identify as working-class is not essentially
to ask that one’s group identity be respected as any other: ‘From the economic
standpoint, […] what poor people want is not to contribute to diversity but
to minimize their contribution to it – they want to stop being poor’.33
Nonetheless, despite such problems, opposition to the mythology of  Scot-
tish cultural unanimism is an important and easily recognisable feature of  the
critical landscape. But there is something rather ambiguous in the declared anti-
essentialist credentials of  this critical programme. Even though the language
of  anti-essentialism is frequently invoked, the critical literature becomes too
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often fixated on opposition to a homogeneous nominal essence, rather than
upon the more important thesis of  the non-existence of  an inherent or under-
lying real essence of  Scottishness. The latter element, which is really the crux
of  anti-essentialism, tends to be simply sidelined. As a consequence, the attack
on the myth of  Scottish unanimism subtly transforms itself  into something
fundamentally essentialist. The illusion of  cultural homogeneity is reconfigured
as a pre-theoretical appearance stripped away by methodical investigation to
reveal a previously hidden cultural plurality. This plurality is then offered –
equivocally, not quite explicitly – as the real essence of  Scottishness.
Evidence of  this retreat from anti-essentialism sensu stricto is apparent in many
of  the putatively anti-essentialist claims that have recently been made in Scot-
tish literary and cultural criticism. In one statement of  supposed anti- essentialism,
for instance, it is argued that ‘opening out the possibilities of  nationhood does
not equal abandoning the national past or culture; rather it involves a revision
of  how we understand and represent these, with an emphasis on the need for
recognising internal difference and alterity’.34 This statement points back toward
essentialism: the possibilities of  nationhood are, we should note, constrained by
the national past or culture. The representation of  ‘internal difference and alterity’
is, to be sure, more factually accurate, for it explodes the myth of  cultural unan-
imism. But this representation is reconfigured as a display of  the authentic
‘possibilities’ of  nationhood that somehow legitimates a more culturally diverse
society. Nor is the above passage an isolated gesture towards diversity as the
new standard of  authentic Scottishness. There is, in truth, a great deal of  emphasis
in the relevant literature on re-reading Scottishness in order to find the authentic
diversity of  the Scottish national character. In the introduction to Beyond Scot-
land, as I have already indicated, we are told that Scottish literature ‘has found
its “proper ground” in heterogeneity and inter-dependence’.35 The use of  quota-
tion marks here indicates an embarrassment for the anti-essentialist credentials
of  the volume: the idea of  heterogeneity as something belonging to and grounding
Scottish culture is precisely a residual idea of  a real national essence. In another,
earlier statement in the putatively anti-essentialist strand of  Scottish cultural crit-
icism, it is argued that any authentic exponent of  a national culture – and, a
fortiori, any authentic exponent of  Scottish culture – must celebrate the diver-
sity and hybridity found within it: ‘home has no one, pure language; its language
is heteroglot, richly impure. Writers who delight in this seem to me more authen-
tically “identifying poets”’.36 The monoglot writer, by implication, is untrue to
his or her nation. This problematic trend is apparent also in the introduction
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to another edited volume, Ethically Speaking, a title which indicates the supposed
ethical implications of  putatively anti-essentialist Scottish literary criticism. The
editors ask:
Can the writing of  the novelists, poets and translators contemporaneous
with the emergence of  a newly empowered Scotland help us to read the
country and its people in a new way? Perhaps most usefully, they remind
us of  a small nation’s sheer diversity.37
They conclude by remarking that, ‘[e]thically speaking, Scottish writers point
out the need to attend to many different narratives and retellings in order that
Scots might live more honestly and clearsightedly with themselves’.38 The impli-
cation is that the Scots should commit politically-cum-ethically to diversity once
they remember, through clear-sighted and honest self-apprehension, the under-
lying nature of  their national culture.
A puzzling and improper transition can be discerned in these statements,
for they all imply that a national commitment to greater cultural homogeneity
would be an improper, inauthentic, superficial or illegitimate expression of
Scottishness. The anti-essentialist critic should, I have argued, reveal Scotland’s
cultural diversity only because cultural unanimism is a corollary (as ‘nominal
essence’) to a mistaken belief  in a real national essence. But, as shown in the
examples above, Scottish critics marching under the banner of  anti-essentialism
frequently expose cultural diversity in order to then espouse it as the deeper,
essential reality to which the healthy, authentic, properly-identifying nation
should conform.
One way to obscure such lingering essentialism is to translate it into metaphors
that equate nation and selfhood, so that national essentialism becomes cloaked
with a psychological, spiritual vocabulary. There is more sympathy, I suspect,
for the idea of  a person being true to him- or herself  than for the idea of  a
nation being true to itself. Metaphors of  a national psyche can therefore exploit
the more appealing notion of  personal authenticity. We find in such rhetoric
what Appiah calls ‘the philosophical realism (which is nowadays usually called
“essentialism”) that seems inherent in the way questions of  authenticity are
normally posed. Authenticity speaks of  the real self  buried in there, the self
one has to dig out and express’.39 What the putatively anti-essentialist Scottish
literary and cultural critic may therefore do is to apply the ideal of  personal
authenticity to the being of  the nation, thereby creating a national essentialism
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translated into metaphors of  spiritual slumber and awakening. In so doing, of
course, he or she returns to the essentialism of  national character proposed
by Herder, who ‘applied his conception of  originality […] not only to the indi-
vidual person among other persons, but also to the culture-bearing people
among other peoples. Just like individuals, a Volk should be true to itself.’40
A discussion of  Scottish Catholic literature in the collection Beyond Scotland
provides in my view a useful illustration of  this mistaken return to essentialism
within the supposedly anti-essentialist programme in Scottish literary and cultural
studies. In an essay significantly entitled ‘The Return of  the Repressed’, the
representation of  a heterogeneous cultural reality is moulded into a national
analogue to the psychological phenomena of  self-awareness, authenticity, and
anamnesis. According to this essay, Scotland has been unconscious of  what it
really is: mixed and impure – ‘certain Scottish identities, whether aesthetic or
critical, are deliberately built on exclusion or, in Freud’s phrase, “pushed out of
consciousness”; […] the subject of  what is here termed “repression” is eloquent
of  certain unexamined “anxieties” within mainstream Scottish criticism’.41 The
elision of  Scottish Catholic history and traditions is thus a kind of  national
amnesia: ‘despite assertion and celebration of  Scottish literary and critical
“plurality” (“Scotlands”, not “Scotland”), there persists a sense in which some
cultural roots are remembered more than others’.42 Although the essay contends
that ‘Scottish literature still needs to relinquish its investment in the idea of
“tradi tion(s)”, bound up with ideas of  “authenticity”’,43 it is exactly the idea
of  an authentic tradition that its argument relies upon: by ‘remembering’ a
heterogeneous cultural history, Scotland becomes truer to itself. 
The above essay refers to the composer James MacMillan’s 1999 lecture to
the Edinburgh International Festival on what he perceives as an anti- Catholicism
endemic in Scottish culture. The influence of  MacMillan’s argument, which
became a cause célèbre in discussions of  Scottish sectarianism, may well have
something to do with the misunderstandings of  anti-essentialism that I have
identified. The lecture presents, in my view, a paradigm of  the mistaken return
to essentialism within the nominally anti-essentialist programme. The cause of
anti-Catholic feeling is identified by MacMillan as a ‘tendency to restrict, to
control and to enforce conformity and homogeneity’.44 Yet, while dissolving
the myth of  a homogeneous Scottish culture, MacMillan’s argument simulta-
neously offers the awakening of  a deeper, more authentic, pluralistic national
character: ‘If  I have a mission I think this must involve acts of  remembrance,
of  recollection, of  rediscovery of  our past, or re-animation of  our heritage,
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of  a reawakening of  our culture’.45 If  Scots do not unforget their past, then
they will ‘see history begin to repeat itself ’: the (alleged) recent history of  anti-
Catholic discrimination will find its analogue in ‘religious and racist prejudice’
directed at the Scottish Islamic community.46
There is, of  course, a factual problem with this argument: namely, just whether
there is indeed endemic anti-Catholic sentiment in Scotland, accompanied by
a more general hostility to diversity. Sectarianism is still found in certain sections
of  the Scottish population, but it seems to be on the decline. This is certainly
what Steve Bruce and his co-authors believe: they conclude that ‘changes in
the Scottish economy, polity and society since the late 1930s have reduced the
importance of  religious and ethnic identity to a point of  irrelevance’;47 they
also argue that homophobia is declining.48 Bruce et al. present no figures for
racism, but even were racism not declining (which I think is unlikely), Scot-
land is in the same political position regarding racism as that identified by
Walter Benn Michaels for the US:
even when we are racist, the society to which we are committed is not.
This is partly because racism has been pushed to the fringes of  public
life and partly because racism has been privatized, converted from a
political position into a personal failing.49
There seems little evidence in devolved Scotland of  any determination at a
political level to legitimate homophobia, sectarianism, or any other manifesta-
tion of  anti-diversity feeling. 
The kind of  argument advanced by MacMillan is also confusing because it
leaves entirely empty just what kind of  pluralism will naturally occur to the
Scot who ‘remembers’ the history of  Scottish Catholicism. Will he or she recog-
nise ‘a homology between identity groups and persons’,50 and so argue, perhaps,
that identity groups have rights, and even rights over the autonomy of  their
members? Will there be ‘exit routes’ from subnational group identity – or will
apostasy, and its secular equivalents, be forbidden or penalised? And at what
point does a minority become sizeable enough to be recognized in, for instance,
separate state provision, such as education? These are just some of  the imme-
diately obvious questions about what pluralism might mean in Scotland. There
are surely many others. But all these interesting and vital questions are entirely
bypassed by ‘the celebration of  diversity’51 supposedly mandated by the reawak-
ened ‘memory’ of  the authentically identifying Scot.
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Leaving aside such difficulties, however, the central problem lies in the pecu-
liar metaphors of  cultural memory which are used within MacMillan’s lecture.
Incongruous though it may sound, these tropes mean that its argument is an
exercise in the same spirit as Toni Morrison’s novel Beloved (1987). As Michaels
notes, ‘Beloved, according to Morrison, is a story about something no one wants
to remember. […] What no one wants to remember, she thinks, is slavery, […]
although no white people or black people now living ever experienced it, slavery
can be and must be either remembered or forgotten.’52 In a similar vein, one
might point out that no-one alive today remembers pre-Reformation Scotland;
they may or may not know about it, but this knowledge is not memory. Yet,
in the anamnestic argument, the phenomena of  cultural transmission, conti-
nuity, and change are strategically modelled on a psychic analogy of  forget-
fulness and remembrance. I say ‘strategically’ modelled, because the project of
recovery from a homogenising national ‘memory’ is not purely cognitive in its
interest. Our anamnesis as Scots, our ‘awakening’ to our ‘cultural roots’, is not
merely a matter of  knowing things better than we did; it is a matter of  knowing
ourselves better than we did, and so knowing a more accurate conception of
what is good for us. And with this improved conception of  who we essen-
tially are (plural, diverse, heterogeneous), we are supposed to recognise the
wrongfulness of  contemporary sectarianism and its alleged analogues. Oppo-
sition to diversity is not shown to be categorically wrong; it is shown to be
wrong for us. 
This kind of  argument, in which the cultural critic is something like a coun-
sellor or psychotherapist to the nation, is inconsistent with a properly anti-
essentialist programme. The problem is, as Michaels puts it, that the
anti-essentialist must accept that ‘insofar as our culture remains nothing more
than what we do and believe, it is impotently descriptive’.53 He gives the
example of  the teaching of  Shakespeare:
It makes no sense, for example, to claim that we shouldn’t teach Shake-
speare because he isn’t part of  our culture since to teach him will imme-
diately make him part of  our culture, but it also makes no sense to claim
that we should teach him because he is part of  our culture since, if  we
stop teaching him, he won’t be any longer.54
The distinction between right or wrong, should or should not, collapses: there
is nothing that would count as not doing what one should do, precisely because
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what one should do is defined as what one does. To return to a Scottish context,
to say that we should be politically committed to diversity because that is our
way of  doing things is to mistakenly construe a fact as a norm. The only way
out of  this impasse would be to argue that some of  our ways of  doing things
(e.g. political pluralism) are in greater harmony with our essential Scottishness.
With this essentialist proviso in mind, one could then claim that even if  oppo-
sition to cultural diversity were politically mandated, it would nonetheless be
a betrayal of  genuine Scottishness.
But, beyond its inconsistency with anti-essentialism, it is doubtful even that
the national authenticity argument is in fact what matters to those who call for
the celebration of  diversity. Consider that, logically, the anamnestic argument
opens up the possibility of  quite another Scottish culture in which opposition
to cultural diversity would be an honest expression of  essential Scottish values.
Let us imagine that we could not identify a plural Scotland: let us say that Scot-
land’s past culture was homogeneous. In this case, using the anamnestic model,
sectarianism and xenophobia would be good for us, once we had reawakened
to our homogeneous cultural roots, and so recovered from our psychopatho-
logical tendency to enforce cultural diversity. The anamnestic argument makes
a political commitment to diversity contingent upon the recovery of  a plural
tradition – but I am sure that the claim for pluralism is far stronger than the
supposed fact of  its continuity with particular national traditions.
No-one, then, really believes that we should commit to political pluralism
only if  we can recover an authentic tradition of  diversity. But just why is accu-
rate scholarship on Scottish literature and culture represented as having this
politically legitimatory role? A full answer is beyond the scope of  this essay,
but I speculate that it would involve the more general political demand that
the humanities produce socially ‘useful’ knowledge. The debate around cultural
pluralism has become immensely significant in recent years, and presents a
marketing opportunity for the arts and humanities: how better to secure pres-
tige and ‘relevance’ than to misrepresent anti-essentialism as the legitimation
of  a pluralistic political programme? The ultimate significance of  anti- essentialism
is, however, quite different: once freed from the demand that our political
culture properly manifest our underlying national character, we no longer have
to discover the real essence of  the nation in order to justify what we do.
Perhaps, of  course, the man or woman in the street thinks differently, and will
only consent to pluralism when it is shown to be sufficiently Scottish. But
though the manufacture of  consent in this way may be a task suited to the
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politician, it can be of  no interest to the rigorously anti-essentialist critic, who
must regard this mode of  justification as merely a popular error.
Moreover, once a properly anti-essentialist criticism becomes established in
Scottish Studies, there will be some notable scholarly benefits. Scottish literary
and cultural studies seem to me inhibited at the moment by the anxiety that
any account of  national distinctiveness, and of  the reasons for it, is the impo-
sition of  a mythical national homogeneity upon Scotland’s fundamental plurality.
In my own work on the history of  Scottish ideas, I have argued for the exis-
tence of  a distinctive type of  Scottish psychoanalysis that rejected the Freudian
account in which human life was fundamentally hedonistic, selfish, and asocial.55
Scottish psychoanalysis argued instead that human beings were essentially
social, and that the ‘tenderness’ between infant and carer was more important
than their supposed ‘erotic’ relation. But my conclusion that Scottish psycho-
analysis was distinctive when compared to developments in France, the USA,
and even England, is not an assertion that this distinctiveness was the expres-
sion of  some underlying ‘cultural DNA’. Instead, this difference was the outcome
of  a number of  different factors at work in Scotland: a tradition of  philo-
sophical inquiry into all disciplines (including psychoanalysis), a search for a
way to ‘demythologise’ Christian ideas such as communion and repentance, the
greater prominence in Scotland of  psychoanalytic theorists such as Alfred
Adler, the relative geographical isolation of  Scots from the schools established
in London – these are a few of  the relevant ‘variables’. The moral that can be
drawn from my own work applies more generally to Scottish cultural and
literary studies, a field in which researchers may yet hope to discuss the nation-
ally distinctive development of  music, literature, philosophy, theology, and a
host of  other phenomena. Nationality is one dimension of  cultural difference,
and there are factors – other than the existence of  some supposed ‘national
essence’ – which explain how and why certain kinds of  national difference
arise. To be able to do research in this area, one must be allowed to discuss
Scottish distinctiveness without the inhibiting anxiety that one’s results will be
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